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We propose a framework to describe, analyze, and explain the conditions under which scientiﬁc com-
munities organize themselves to do research, particularly within large-scale, multidisciplinary projects.
The framework centers on the notion of a research repertoire, which encompasses well-aligned as-
semblages of the skills, behaviors, and material, social, and epistemic components that a group may use
to practice certain kinds of science, and whose enactment affects the methods and results of research.
This account provides an alternative to the idea of Kuhnian paradigms for understanding scientiﬁc
change in the following ways: (1) it does not frame change as primarily generated and shaped by
theoretical developments, but rather takes account of administrative, material, technological, and
institutional innovations that contribute to change and explicitly questions whether and how such in-
novations accompany, underpin, and/or undercut theoretical shifts; (2) it thus allows for tracking of the
organization, continuity, and coherence in research practices which Kuhn characterized as ‘normal sci-
ence’ without relying on the occurrence of paradigmatic shifts and revolutions to be able to identify
relevant components; and (3) it requires particular attention be paid to the performative aspects of
science, whose study Kuhn pioneered but which he did not extensively conceptualize. We provide a
detailed characterization of repertoires and discuss their relationship with communities, disciplines, and
other forms of collaborative activities within science, building on an analysis of historical episodes and
contemporary developments in the life sciences, as well as cases drawn from social and historical studies
of physics, psychology, and medicine.
 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
A vast body of scholarship in the history, philosophy, and social
studies of science underscores the critical role of collaboration in
the development of scientiﬁc knowledge (to name just a few
examples, see Griesemer & Gerson, 1993; Wray 2001, 2002;
Hackett, 2005; Shrum, Chompalov, & Genuth, 2007; Gerson,
2009; Gorman, 2010; Andersen 2010, 2016).1 Many forms of
scientiﬁc collaboration have been documented and analyzed,(R.A. Ankeny), s.leonelli@
losophical literature on social
ration from the philosophy of
relevant from a philosophy of
aking a link between formal
important task, but one that
ier Ltd. This is an open access artiincluding co-located and dispersed, short and long-term, virtual
and in-person, large and small scale, and even voluntary and
involuntary (Nersessian, 2006; Felt, 2009; Parker, Vermeulen, &
Penders, 2010; MacLeod & Nersessian, 2013). Collaboration often
involves individuals with different skills, training, and goals, who
are not co-located and who, even when working toward common
goals, are subject to diverse institutional,2 cultural, and ﬁnancial2We are using the term ‘institution’ as typically utilized in ordinary language and
science and technology studies as a generic descriptor to refer to legal, political,
commercial, social, or other types of formal and informal organizations or struc-
tures including, but not limited to, governmental and state-based bodies and also to
broader systems such as property, law, or even science and technology; for
instance, see Jasanoff, 2004; Jasanoff, 2012. In its stricter, sociological sense, ‘in-
stitutions’ are stable patterns of human behavior or activity that deﬁne, govern, and
constrain action or rules that connect an individual or organization to a larger social
environment, and that reproduce themselves. Classic references include Hughes,
1970 and Scott 1995; for a philosophically-oriented exploration of this concept,
see Miller 2014.
cle under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
R.A. Ankeny, S. Leonelli / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 60 (2016) 18e28 19pressures, particularly in the contemporary context of ‘big science’
carried out through multidisciplinary projects occurring within
international networks (Price, 1965; Hughes, 2002; Davies, Frow, &
Leonelli, 2013). It is clear from existing scholarship that research
groups have variable degrees of continuity, longevity, and dura-
bility, depending on their relation to existing knowledge, materials,
technologies, and institutions, as well as on the social dynamics
within and beyond their boundaries (Galison, 1997; Knorr-Cetina,
1999; Latour, 1987). Furthermore, it is evident that the organiza-
tion of research groups, and the ways inwhich they are constructed
and managed, has a major impact on the quality and types of
outputs that are produced (Longino, 2002; Rolin, 2008; Solomon
2001; Wray 2002).
Philosophers of science have paid some attention to the orga-
nization of research and its epistemic implications. They have
analyzed the mechanisms that underlie collaborative work,
focusing particularly on the division of labor involved (Thagard,
1997), the use of theories, models, and tools as conduits to
communication and integration (Star and Griesemer 1989;
Nersessian and Patton, 2009), and the typologies and patterns of
epistemic dependence involved in the distribution of cognitive
labor among interdisciplinary collaborators (Andersen 2016;
Andersen and Wagenknecht 2013).3 However, there is still
relatively limited philosophical work on what constitutes a
research community, how communities change over time, and
how the development of collaborations relates to the production
and development of knowledge within the various social, cultural,
institutional, and economic environments in which scientiﬁc
research occurs.4 In short, philosophers of science have hitherto
paid little attention to collaboration, and more generally the social
organization of research, as lenses through which to think about
and analyze scientiﬁc change.
Existing characterizations of communities in terms of shared
theories, which in turn constitute a discipline or ﬁeld, and which
can be challenged and reconstituted depending on conceptual
shifts, have greatly enhanced our understanding of the dynamics
of scientiﬁc change and how to account for research ‘progress’ (e.g.,
Darden and Maull 1977; Kuhn, 1962; Shapere, 1977; Toulmin,
1972). However, these accounts have limited value for making
sense of multidisciplinary efforts, where successful collaboration
involves the harmonious merging of different types of expertise
and disciplinary training. Most importantly for our purposes, they
also fail to account for the critical roles played by social, political,
and economic factors in the development and outcomes of
research practices, and for the observation (often made within
historical and social studies of science) that scientiﬁc innovations
can take many forms other than the advancement of new theories
or concepts, and are not necessarily tied to paradigmatic shifts.
In this paper, we propose a framework for analyzing the
emergence, development, and evolution of collaborations, partic-
ularly in scientiﬁc practice.5 We contend that this framework
will facilitate philosophical analysis and explanation of critical3Detailed discussions of integration also are provided by Mitchell (2009) under the
heading of ‘integrative pluralism’; Chang (2012) in his discussion of the three
modalities through which systems of practice can interact to produce knowledge,
one of which is integration; and the contributors to a special section on integration
(Brigandt, 2013), particularly Gerson (2013) on organizational mechanisms.
4We do not attempt to deﬁne which parts of scientiﬁc practice are ‘external’ or
‘internal’ to it, as this distinction is often arbitrary (see Shapin 1992) and is un-
necessary for our arguments; see also Longino’s rejection (2002) of the usual
distinction made between the ‘social’ and the ‘rational.’
5Although we focus in this paper on scientiﬁc researchers, we believe our
framework could be useful more generally to a range of types of research including
in the humanities.questions around the functioning, ﬂexibility, durability, and
longevity of research groupings and their outputs, including the
formation of research communities. We are particularly interested
in tracing the material, social, and epistemic conditions under
which individuals are able to join together to perform projects and
achieve common goals, in ways that are relatively robust over time
despite environmental and other types of changes, and can be
transferred to and learnt by other groups interested in similar goals.
We refer to these conditions, which include ways towield and align
speciﬁc skills and behaviors with appropriate methods, epistemic
components, materials, resources, participants, and infrastructures,
as repertoires. We argue that the creation or adoption of one or
more repertoires has a strong inﬂuence on the identity, boundaries,
practices and outputs of research groups, whether their individual
members explicitly recognize these impacts or not. At the same
time, a repertoire is not a necessary condition for the production of
scientiﬁc knowledge and/or the emergence of stable and/or
coherent research groups. Indeed, not all research groups have a
repertoire, and many creative and innovative scientiﬁc initiatives
grow at the margins of, or in outright opposition to, the most long-
lived repertoires, with signiﬁcant consequences in terms of their
visibility, reputation, and resources. This perspective has
implications for various research practices including credit
attribution, and supports a highly distributedmodel of how science
is done.
This argument builds on empirical insights by historians and
philosophers of science on practices within contemporary
research communities in the experimental life sciences, as well as
cases drawn from social and historical studies of other sciences
including physics, psychology, and medicine. We analyze the
parallels and dissimilarities between our approach and
philosophical discussions of scientiﬁc change, and discuss in detail
the characteristics, composition, and performative nature of
repertoires. We then reﬂect onwhat it means for a repertoire to be
resilient and transferrable, the relationship between repertoires
and communities, and the signiﬁcance of the alignment of
repertoire components in terms of evaluating the success and
longevity of particular repertoires and its broader epistemic and
social implications. Finally, we discuss the scope of repertoires and
their usefulness as methodological frameworks for philosophers
to reconstruct, compare, and evaluate scientiﬁc strategies and
developments across time, space, cultures, and disciplines,
without being forced to focus solely or primarily on examples
involving substantial theoretical or conceptual change.
2. Paradigms versus repertoires: capturing performance
In his seminal work The Structure of Scientiﬁc Revolutions (1962),
Thomas S. Kuhn uses the term ‘paradigm’ to identify activities that
are simultaneously conceptual, social, and material and that are
constitutive of research communities, and points to ‘revolutionary’
paradigmatic shifts as ways to identify and circumscribe such
activities into coherent and stable assemblages. This intertwining
of conceptual, social, and material factors in research is a core idea
that serves as a starting point for our ownwork. However, as many
commentators have observed, paradigms are not very useful as a
framing concept particularly for the analysis of contemporary
science. First, they are highly static and inﬂexible entities in which
change only occurs in dramatic fashion. This conceptualization of
scientiﬁc change does not adequately capture the dynamic nature
and pace of scientiﬁc practice, nor does it do justice to the shifts in
technology, theorizing, and methods that happen within research
communities at any one point in time (Galison, 1997; Hoyningen-
Huene 2013). Second, conﬂicting paradigms are considered by
Kuhn to be incommensurable, which implies that the adoption of a
9We are here deﬁning ‘performativity’ as the agency involved in materially real-
izing propositional and/or embodied knowledge, for instance when uttering a
sentence in reply to a question, or performing an action to achieve a particular goal.
10
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except in extreme moments of crisis. In contrast, researchers can
and do move between different approaches and models of work,
depending on circumstances, including making smaller-scale
changes and using more than one approach simultaneously (Fleck
1979 [1935]; Giere, 2006; Griesemer 2006; MacLeod &
Nersessian, 2013; Gerson, 2013).
Third, Kuhn’s account and his choice of case studies gives undue
primacy to theoretical knowledge as primary output of science, with
major theoretical shifts (such as those involved in the Copernican
revolution) functioning as a means to identify signiﬁcant changes
within science and develop historical and philosophical narratives
about scientiﬁc change more generally. Because of this assumption,
and despite Kuhn’s own deep awareness of the signiﬁcance of
material and social aspects of research, the idea of a ‘paradigm’ does
not provide guidance for those who wish to investigate and analyze
the critical roles of shifts in technologies, social and institutional
resources and infrastructures, and procedures and norms
speciﬁcally aimed at stimulating institutional and ﬁnancial support
for science.6 This rather narrow focus encourages an excessively
internalistic view of scientiﬁc practice,7 in which strategies and
activities aimed at attracting and retaining material, human,
economic, and political resources tend to be viewed as external to
the processes of scientiﬁc research, and may be acknowledged as
signiﬁcant only when they directly shape the content of the
propositional knowledge derived from these processes. In contrast,
we contend that consideration of what results from research needs
to encompass a much wider range of phenomena including
technological innovations, data generation, the production of new
models and visualization techniques, and novel ways to organize,
manage, and support research communities. Thus decisions and
strategies concerning funding as well as the management and
dissemination of resources and outputs (among other factors) are as
scientiﬁcally and epistemologically signiﬁcant as decisions and
reasoning about theory, methods, instrumentation, technologies,
and models, as well as the types of expertise and compositions of
the groups tasked with performing research.8 Hence we introduce
the notion of ‘repertoires,’ which we deﬁne as the well-aligned
assemblages of skills, behaviors, and material, social, and
epistemic components that groupsmay use to practice certain kinds
of science, and whose enactment affects the methods and results of
research, including how groups practice and manage research and
train newcomers.
The term repertoire comes from the French répertoire, which in
turn derives from the Latin repertorium (repertorio in Italian).
The original and narrow etymology, which resonates with
contemporary common usage of the term, refers to “listing,
catalogue, inventories” that can help one to ﬁnd items easily
without necessarily having been involved in collecting the relevant
materials in the ﬁrst place. The term then was adopted by
performing artists, particularly actors and musicians, starting from
the mid-19th century in Italy and France as a way to refer6Lakatos’s views on research programmes (1970), though much less inﬂexible
concerning the degree of changes happening within any given programme, are
susceptible to similar critiques.
7This interpretation is one that Kuhn himself would likely endorse (Kuhn, 2000, p.
287). On Kuhn’s internalism, see especially Wray 2010.
8Our view aligns well with Chang’s pragmatist reading of knowledge (including
scientiﬁc knowledge) as the ability to perform given epistemic activities (Chang,
2012), and with the interpretation of naturalism as principal philosophical
approach to the study of scientiﬁc practice recently defended by Rouse (2015): “The
ongoing practice of scientiﬁc research encompasses the relevant form of scientiﬁc
understanding; efforts to extract a substantive body of knowledge from that
practice are among the philosophical impositions upon science that naturalists
should reject” (7).simultaneously to the works they performed and the abilities and
skills through which they could be reproduced, together with the
unique characteristics of speciﬁc enactments of the works. The term
thus acquired an increasingly performative quality, and is currently
used in French, English, and Italian to refer to the constellation of
knowledge, resources, and abilities needed to be able to engage in a
speciﬁc type of performance.9 The Oxford English Dictionary now
deﬁnes a ‘repertoire’ in two main ways: as the “body of items that
are regularly performed” and as the “stock of skills or types of
behavior that a person habitually uses.” In our analysis, we exploit
the complementary character of these two deﬁnitions of ‘repertoire.’
On the one hand, scientiﬁc repertoires include material and
conceptual elements, such as speciﬁc technologies, methods, and
theories. Indeed, the adoption and use of instruments and concepts
is a crucial step within the establishment of a repertoire, which is
why many 20th century philosophers have identiﬁed these
elements as core components of research programs (e.g., Bachelard
1978 [1934]; Lakatos, 1970; Laudan, 1970). On the other hand, a
repertoire only emerges when scientists establish what they
perceive to be reliable and effective ways to work with these ideas
and materials within and across groups, which typically means
developing appropriate social structures and know-how (ways of
distributing labor, norms, skills, and behaviors). Most importantly,
the development of a repertoire involves the elaboration of
strategies for coordinating and managing these conceptual,
material, and social components, so that when they are combined,
they produce the intended performance.10 Repertoires are thus not
simply inventories of elements that need to be combined in order to
be able to conduct a given type of project, and/or achieve a given
epistemic goal; crucially, they include knowledge of how to align
such inventories of elements so that they can be effectively used to
acquire the resources, capacities, and expertise needed to pursue an
inquiry.
The idea of repertoire thus characterized bears marked
similarities to Kuhn’s notion of ‘exemplars’ as models for how to
perform research. At the same time, Kuhn does not take exemplars
to include social, institutional, and economic features, and treats
them primarily as pedagogical tools that play key roles in scientiﬁc
training rather than research (which also explains why exemplars
do not ﬁgure prominently in his account of paradigms as units
of scientiﬁc change). By contrast, we view repertoires as key
components of much cutting-edge scientiﬁc practice, an under-
standing that brings our views closer to Ludwik Fleck’s discussions
(1979 [1935]) of ‘thought styles’ and particularly teamwork.11
Another fruitful philosophical notion which informs our
framework is Hasok Chang’s ‘systems of practice,’ which he deﬁnes
as “a coherent set of epistemic activities performed with a view toThe emphasis on performative aspects of scientiﬁc practice distinguishes our
usage from Gilbert and Mulkay’s interpretation (1984) of ‘repertoires’ as primarily
or solely about discourse, and also from the focus by Rip and Talma (1998) on
repertoires as patterns reproduced particularly in debates around new and
emerging technologies. As they retain ﬂexibility vis-à-vis historical and scientiﬁc
developments and also incorporate both social and epistemic elements, our un-
derstanding of ‘repertoire’ also is different than that typically used in social
movements and political theory. For instance, our usage is more inclusive than
Swidler’s (1986) which is intended as an antidote to Weberian views on culture,
which sees repertoires as the source of a ‘tool kit’ of symbols, stories, rituals, and
world-views fromwhich actors can select different elements to shape their actions.
11 In Fleck’s terms, ‘team work’ is not simply an additive process of individual ac-
tivities which contribute to the whole (1979 [1935], 99), but functions via a range of
cooperative practices. He explicitly uses metaphors from the performing arts
including the playing of an orchestra; however, his discussion focuses solely on the
epistemic aspects of scientiﬁc practice in relation to ‘thought styles.’
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more-or-less coherent set of mental and physical operations that
are intended to contribute to the production or improvement of
knowledge in a particular way, in accordancewith some discernible
rules (though the rules may be unarticulated)” (16). While this
account of epistemic activities is fully compatible with our views,
note that Chang is primarily interested in analyzing the intellectual
and material conditions within which scientiﬁc claims can be
produced, evaluated, and understood. As a consequence, he pays
less attention to the performative, social, ﬁnancial, and organiza-
tional components involved in the establishment, evolution, and
reproduction of particular ways of doing research. Our notion of
repertoire is therefore broader than his system of practice, with
each repertoire potentially involving one or more such systems, as
well as practices that play prominent roles in shaping the nature
and results of scientiﬁc knowledge production, and yet are not
epistemic in Chang’s deﬁnition (i.e., they may not be intended to
contribute to the development of knowledge claims, and even
when they do, it may not always be possible to deﬁne the rules
through which this happens). Similarly, Hans-Jörg Rheinberger’s
analysis (1997) of how research communities are built around
and develop experimental systems is complementary to ours, since
these systems are often crucial components of repertoires and
Rheinberger insists on the importance of practices and related
know-how as key research outputs. However, his account focuses
primarily on the management of laboratory environments, leaving
aside the broader socio-economic dynamics captured by our
framework.12
Our interpretation of the term ‘repertoire’ owes much to
research done on other areas of human activity, and particularly on
the performance of music, acting, painting, and cooking. In science
as in the arts and crafts, repertoires capture behaviors, skills, and
abilities that are always enacted in speciﬁc spatio-temporal
circumstances and indeed do not exist independently of their
local manifestations. Nonetheless, repertoires can be analytically
abstracted from their speciﬁc performances at any one point in
time, and can thus provide a recipe for the assemblage of skills,
concepts, instruments, materials, settings, strategies, procedures,
and institutions required to perform. The recipe can change
depending on its speciﬁc enactments at any one point in time, and
yet it remains recognizable in its historical lineage and evolution.13
As sociologists Robert R. Faulkner and Howard Becker (2009; see
also Becker & Faulkner, 2013) put it in their analysis of repertoires in
jazz music, it is “important to not only know it [the items in the
repertoire, e.g. the songs], but to know what to do with it, i.e. to
enact it.”
We view this performative aspect of repertoires as critical,
especially in comparison to philosophical work on styles of
reasoning, which tends to ignore it in favor of aspects that are
more easily speciﬁable without reference to skills and behaviors.
For instance, both A. C. Crombie (1994) and Ian Hacking (1992,
2002) associate ‘styles of reasoning’ with conceptual and material
tools and protocols, rather than with speciﬁc abilities and ways of
proceeding; Otávio Bueno (2012) defends an even narrower
concept of ‘styles of reasoning’ as a pattern of inferential relations
speciﬁc to a scientiﬁc subﬁeld. Our views are closer to John
Pickstone’s account (2000) of ‘ways of knowing,’ which include12This feature of experimental systems is explicitly acknowledged by Rheinberger
writing with Müller-Wille (2012) on their cultural take on the history of heredity,
where they expand the scope of their analysis by introducing the notion of
‘epistemic space.’
13We do not have space in this paper to investigate similarities (and differences) to
the use of recipe in the context of repertoires and Marcel Boumans’s use of the term
with regard to models (1999), but this topic warrants additional exploration.an emphasis on historical and practical aspects of performance:
repertoires may indeed be viewed as local arrangements through
which different ways of knowing come together, and which, if re-
enacted in a variety of situations in several groups in ways that
make them resilient in the long term, may themselves become a
speciﬁc way of knowing.14
3. Examples and key characteristics of repertoires
Wenow turn to recent empirical work on experimental cultures
and practices in the life sciences as an exempliﬁcation of what we
consider to be successful repertoires.15 For instance, consider
model organism research. A small group of species, including the
fruit ﬂy Drosophila melanogaster, the nematode Caenorhabditis
elegans, the zebraﬁsh Danio rerio, the budding yeast Saccharomyces
cerevisiae, and the weed Arabidopsis thaliana, has dominated
experimental work in molecular biology over recent decades. This
dominance has not arisen because they constitute the best
biological materials with which to work in any objective sense,
nor because other species are too difﬁcult or unwieldy for
experimental work (as Dietrich, Ankeny, & Chen, 2014 demon-
strates, research on non-model organisms continues to ﬂourish),
though many model organism species were initially adopted
because of their tractability, ease of storage, and low costs of
production and maintenance. Instead, these species have risen to
prominence thanks to their proponents’ efforts to portray them as
‘obligatory passage points’ (Callon, 1986) for multidisciplinary
collaboration across biological subﬁelds. The proponents of the key
model organisms were able to convince colleagues, peers, and
large-scale governmental funders that repeated use of and
reference to the same organism provides critical opportunities for
sharing knowledge, materials, and technologies across biological
disciplines and research groups, and indeed constituted an anchor
around which entire research communities could be built (Ankeny
& Leonelli, 2011). Thus, thousands of researchers from a variety of
locations across the globe came to be involved in enacting and
developing a repertoire that included the conceptualization of
speciﬁc organisms as ‘model systems,’ with related theoretical
assumptions and commitments around which research questions
to pursue; strategies to acquire blue-skies funding support
particularly from the US and UK governments, which enabled
research to develop within relatively well-resourced conditions;
speciﬁc norms and behaviors, and particularly an ethos of sharing
data and techniques prior to publication, which were attractive to
like-minded researchers and contributed to the continuity of the
research efforts and their abilities to accrete over time; the stan-
dardization and centralization of the production, use, and
dissemination of specimens in stock centers; and the establish-
ment of databases to gather both published and unpublished data
in a standardized manner. These components may be disparate,
but they are tightly interconnected, and could not function
effectively without each other; for instance, norms around sharing
would not be sustainable in the absence of governmental support
that enables individuals and groups to disseminate results and
materials efﬁciently without having these processes distract from
the doing of research. Signiﬁcantly, the hard-won ability of
researchers to effectively align these components gave rise to a14Another body of literature that bears signiﬁcant parallels to our views is that on
regimes within and beyond techno-scientiﬁc communities (Foucault, 1970; Pestre,
2003; Cambrosio, Keating, and Nelson, 2014). The relation between repertoires and
regimes deserves more attention than we can devote to it here, and we shall
address it in future work.
15The examples that follow are necessarily compressed in historical and other
terms for purposes of this paper.
16For a discussion speciﬁcally focused on the longevity of communities which have
repertoires, see Leonelli and Ankeny, 2015.
17As we discuss in more detail in the next section, these differences in lifespans
raise interesting questions around the durability and longevity of speciﬁc com-
munities in relation to their repertoires.
18Repertoires arguably create ‘publics’ in a recursive way, as proposed by Kelty
(2008) in relation to Open Software.
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labeling and organizing those results for future consultation for a
variety of other research purposes, which shaped biologists’ actual
understanding of these organisms (Leonelli & Ankeny, 2012).
Another, more recent case of a repertoire within the life
sciences can be found in the rise of microbiome projects. The idea
of the ‘microbiome’ arose in the early 2000s with the Human
Microbiome Project and the Gut Microbiome Project (Huss, 2014).
This concept was rapidly adopted within diverse initiatives such as
the Earth Microbiome Project, exploring variation of ecosystem
niche structures at biogeochemical scales; the American Gut
project, which uses crowdsourcing to collect data about microbes
populating the guts of American citizens; the Soil Microbiome,
investigating microbial diversity of prairie soils; the Home
Microbiome Study, analyzing associations between the microbes
of families and their homes; and the Hospital Microbiome,
comparing microbes in hospital environments during and after
construction. These involve highly multidisciplinary teams
distributed across several geographical locations, common
strategies to attract governmental funding, efforts to engage in
international standardization efforts related to the data,
technologies, and software, a commitment to conceptualizing or-
ganisms and ecosystems as multispecies environments with
unique microbial footprints, and a large-scale mode of operation,
relying on vast samples of data acquired via metagenomic in-
vestigations of several microbial populations (so-called ‘big data’)
and exploiting social media and crowdsourcing technologies to
enhance their public proﬁles and attract volunteers in order to
collect samples and help analyze results. Viewing knowledge
about how to effectively align such disparate components as part
of a repertoire highlights the motivations and advantages involved
in developing and adopting this way of organizing and carrying out
research. Scientists working on microbiome projects have
discovered how effective use of social media, standardization
efforts, and open science discourse can reinforce their abilities to
attract resources from diverse funding sources, which in turn
affects the scope and directions of their research.
These two cases illustrate the importance of a repertoire in
enabling coordinated research within a geographically distributed,
multidisciplinary community, thus strongly affecting the
knowledge produced therein. The existence of such coordinated
efforts, and of related funding streams, technologies, and platforms for
exchange and discussion (such as conferences, journals, and digital
infrastructures), are key indicators to identify repertoires. This
means that repertoires are sometimes associated with research
that is highly visible, prestigious, and well-recognized, and thus the
adoption of the repertoire confers a strategic advantage to those
associated with it; however the type and size of the audience to
which repertoires are visible may vary dramatically, depending on
the public appeal and nature of the research, as well as the extent to
which repertoires are consciously acknowledged by their users (see
section 6 on this point). Another important signal, which in our
view is not indispensable but certainly strongly conducive to the
successful establishment of a repertoire (Leonelli and Ankeny
2012), is the commitment of at least some of the scientists
involved to developing a strategic vision for how such an
assemblage of elements may and should work to be able to do
certain kinds of research.
Focusing on repertoires highlights the ingenuity and labor
involved in setting up and successfully managing collaborations
among researchers based in different settings and equipped with
widely differing disciplinary backgrounds and training. The two
cases above also exemplify the conditions under which such
groups are able to endure beyond the completion of a speciﬁc
project, without wedding their work to a particular subﬁeld ofbiology, and thus retaining their multidisciplinary nature.16 At the
same time, these cases demonstrate the potential diversity in the
characteristics and lifespans of repertoires, with the microbiome
example illustrating their power to grow and take hold across a
wide range of research areas over relatively short periods of time,
and the model organism example demonstrating growth of a
repertoire over a relatively long timespan, which nonetheless
resulted in a particularly resilient example.17 Furthermore, these
two repertoires exemplify the crucial role of strategies for
obtaining funding and patronage, as well as the importance of
communication and promotion about research to both peers and
wider publics.18
4. Transferability and variability
Perhaps most crucially, the two cases above illustrate how
the establishment of a repertoire enables speciﬁc types of
collaboration to become transferrable across research groups, thus
creating a well-tested recipe for how to organize research in a
manner that is consistent and effective in terms of achieving
certain goals, given particular environmental conditions. Resil-
ience and transferability of repertoires come from the ways in
which collaborations are organized, particularly with regard to
their accommodation of multidisciplinary perspectives. Precisely
because these collaborations are not strictly modular, it takes
creativity and innovation to produce a model for how those with
different disciplines and skills come together (for instance
computer scientists, statisticians, biologists, and clinicians in the
example below of clinical trials). Nancy Nersessian and Miles
MacLeod have documented the ingenuity involved in creating
multidisciplinary working environments in the context of speciﬁc
laboratories and projects, stressing the versatility of such social
and scientiﬁc constructs through the idea of ‘adaptive problem
spaces,’ in which different experts come together to tackle a
common problem (MacLeod & Nersessian, 2013; Nersessian,
2006). The collaborative arrangements and behaviors devised
within problem spaces do not always give rise to a repertoire, and
may remain local and speciﬁc in the vast majority of cases. In
contrast, our focus on repertoires draws attention to cases where
the complex conceptual, social, andmaterial arrangements created
in relation to one problem are recognized as useful elsewhere, and
then are successfully instantiated beyond the original setting, thus
enabling other researchers to use a readily available framework
without having to ‘reinvent the wheel.’
This type of transference is particularly useful in contemporary
science, where scientiﬁc management involves numerous types of
tasks, ranging from the choice of research questions, tools,
and methods to decisions concerning dissemination, public
engagement, and funding strategies; many researchers look for
ways to curtail time spent on what they view as logistical and
administrative matters, so as to devote as much attention as
possible to intellectual content and procedures. In this respect,
repertoires function much like a franchising business model, where
“a franchisor provides a licensed privilege to the franchisee to do
business and offers assistance in organizing, training,
merchandising, marketing and managing in return for a monetary
consideration” (Small Business Encyclopedia, 2015). A franchise
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or may not include the production of goods, their distribution and
marketing, and strategies for advertisement and consumption.
What attracts investors, and is widely treated as valuable and thus
saleable, is the speciﬁc way in which the business is established,
organized, and enacted. Indeed, selling a franchise typically
involves providing both resources and training (as well as detailed
instructions) for how to deploy those resources, so that individuals
who were not previously associated with the business in question
can replicate it and manage it in new locations with different
characteristics. Research repertoires function in a similar way,
except insofar as the transfer of a repertoire typically does not
involve monetary valuation or transaction, nor does it require
legal agreements around intellectual property. This makes the
relationship between the creators and the users of repertoires
much looser, less regimented, and thus more unstable than
licensing agreements between franchisor and franchisee.19
To underscore this idea, we brieﬂy provide several additional
examples of successful repertoires.20 Within medicine, a well-
documented case is the establishment of clinical trials as the
most authoritative method for the production and validation of
medical evidence. Peter Keating and Alberto Cambrosio (2012) have
discussed clinical trials in oncology as a novel ‘way of knowing,’
distinct from the taxonomy of styles and practices identiﬁed by
Crombie (1994), Hacking (1992, 2002), and Pickstone (2000)
discussed above, and involving speciﬁc ways to enact
assumptions around what constitutes health, treatment, and
patient participation (see also Solomon 2015). Effectively
operationalizing clinical trials, and making them transferrable
across locations and clinical problem spaces, involves the
development and alignment of institutional and scientiﬁc
procedures, funding streams and related spaces (including indus-
trial complexes), norms, and speciﬁc conceptualizations of what
counts as medical knowledge. All of this constitutes a repertoire
which is ﬁrmly anchored around the institution of clinical trials,
and yet involves a host of knowledge and organizational structures
well beyond what is required for the running of any one trial. Most
signiﬁcantly, the entrenchment of this repertoire has paralleled the
institutionalization of randomized controlled trials as the ‘gold
standard’ for evidence-based medicine, which continues to rule
pharmaceutical and other forms of medical research despite
numerous critiques (e.g., Cartwright 2007; Clarke, Gillies, Illari,
Russo, & Williamson, 2014; Timmermans & Berg, 2003).
Within psychology, Freudian psychoanalysis exempliﬁes the
establishment of speciﬁc techniques and theoretical frameworks
for understanding and treating mental illness through the
adoption and enactment of an ensemble of behaviors, physical
arrangements (e.g., the chaise lounge, the positioning of the
analyst with respect to the patient, and use of a silent room
without distractions), and social relations between the analyst,
other analysts, and patients and their families. As documented by
historians (e.g., Schwarz 1999), although publication played an
important role in the dissemination of his ideas, Sigmund Freud’s
attempts to promote his approach went well beyond his books. He
was able to train capable pupils who then transferred the
repertoire to new locales, including its norms and attitudes toward
patients which are much less easy to formalize than other aspects19The franchisor proﬁts ﬁnancially from the wide adoption of its business model,
while there is no clear recognition attached to the creation of a repertoires in
science, except for informal acknowledgment from peers and the advantages
associated with being the ﬁrst to establish it.
20To put these philosophical points into relief, we have chosen well-known ex-
amples that we use in a compressed form, and about which we expect our readers
will be able to ﬁll in the historical and scientiﬁc details via existing literature.of Freudian practice, and are taught through observation, mimicry,
and practice. Of these behaviors perhaps the most familiar are
Freud’s efforts to train pupils to reﬂexively exploit the analyst’s
power position with respect to patients, and channel the sexual
tensions thus created as part of therapy. This process involves not
only conceptual analysis, but the enactment of the most socially
repressed of all behaviors, which in turn requires a speciﬁc
sensitivity and self-knowledge which is impossible to articulate
through text: the behaviors must be performed. The relentless
promotion and re-enactment of this repertoire was crucial to
making Freudian psychoanalysis transferrable beyond Vienna, and
to its institutionalization in Britain and the United States in the
1950s and 1960s.
It is important to note that when transferring or adopting a
repertoire from elsewhere, the goal often is not to reproduce the
repertoire faithfully and in toto. Variations and local speciﬁcity of
performance are not only admissible, but are expected and in some
cases crucial to the successful enactment of a repertoire. To
understand this, it is useful to consider again the analogy with the
performance of jazz repertoires, where what matters is
not meeting some (non-existent) immutable ideals of perfect
performance, but instead giving a performance that is ‘good
enough’ to be recognizable as part of the repertoire, while also
being original enough to be worthwhile based on its own merits
(see Becker & Faulkner, 2013). Similarly, research repertoires need
to remain identiﬁable, so as to retain their effectiveness
and potential transferability, while also acquiring speciﬁc
characteristics to be usable within the particular setting in which
they are enacted. Thus each instantiation of a repertoire is
necessarily subject to variation and change, as speciﬁc enactments
of given behaviors and resources will yield different results,
depending on the interpretations of the individuals involved and
the local situation within which the repertoire is enacted. As a
result, the repertoire as a whole will evolve and develop, while still
retaining integrity and identiﬁable features as any entity with a
traceable historical lineage.
Consider again the example of microbiomes: this repertoire
became successful because it proved useful to attract funding and
interest within and beyond the scientiﬁc world. For it to be
extended to new areas, several components needed to be in place
that would align with the characteristics and norms of this
repertoire: for instance, researchers willing and able to
implement the repertoire’s strategies; unsolved questions of high
interest to funders that could be tackled through the meta-
genomic methods and technologies speciﬁc to the repertoires;
and conceptual assumptions around how living systems can be
investigated that would be compatible with those made within
the repertoire, including whether certain kinds of generalizations
can be reliably extracted from meta-genomic analysis. Thus
implementing the repertoire helped scientists to mobilize and
align these components effectively so as to produce a fruitful and
well-funded environment for research. At the same time, each
instantiation of the microbiome repertoire had to introduce
something unique and new that would give reasons for funders to
support a particular project as a source of original outputs. Thus
while a repertoire can be characterized and recognized at any
point in time by reference to the components, commitments, and
behaviors that recur across each of its instantiations, variations
among those instantiations are required for a repertoire to be
transferable, successful, and persistent beyond the situation
within which it was originally developed. The accumulation of
variations through successive re-enactments constitutes the main
mechanism through which repertoires evolve and change over
time.
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A key set of questions concern the relation between repertoires
and research communities.21 In particular, it is critical to explore
whether a community comes to be deﬁned by the adoption of a
particular repertoire, and whether it is possible for the same
community to simultaneously enact different repertoires. For the
purposes of our present argument, we deﬁne ‘communities’ in a
broad sense as groups of researchers that collaborate towards a
common goal over time, and do so for longer than is required for
the completion of one speciﬁc research project; thus a community
is (in our sense) relatively stable and coherent. While scientiﬁc
communities can be deﬁned and established in a variety of ways,
we contend that a common and effectiveway to form, stabilize, and
maintain a community is through the development or the adoption
of a repertoire.
We also contend that the same community can, and indeed
often does, simultaneously utilize more than one repertoire. In
order to explore this claim, it is critical to note that most of the
examples provided so far in this paper emerged when researchers
consciously put concerns around the development and
maintenance of a particular repertoire at the center of their science.
Researchers involved in setting up the repertoires discussed above
developed their strategies vocally and self-consciously, often by
borrowing ideas from other successful initiatives and adopting a
strongmandate to expand and transmit them. For instance, many of
the architects of modern model organism communities,
particularly Chris and Shauna Sommerville in the case of
Arabidopsis, articulated their visions for how to guarantee longevity
for their communities at the very start of their involvement in the
processes of building these communities. They effectively outlined
the ingredients required to build a repertoire, in part borrowing
fromwhat already existed in the Caenorhabditis elegans community
(Leonelli, 2007), which had been developed in a similar manner.
Finding ways to realize this vision required the joint efforts of two
generations of Arabidopsis researchers, so that the repertoire came
to be long-lived and resilient, and to be adopted by other
communities.
There also are instances where repertoires are an implicit
(rather than well-articulated) aspect of everyday scientiﬁc work,
particularly as some elements of successful repertoires can become
so thoroughly entrenched in research practices so as to become
invisible. This point is underscored by philosophical scholarship on
material, conceptual, and social scaffolding in knowledge
production, which explores the mechanisms through which
concepts, approaches, and tools become embedded within
emerging communities, and highlights the signiﬁcance of such
scaffolds disappearing fromview or being removed altogether once
a particular set of practices is in place (Wimsatt & Griesemer, 2007;
Caporael, Wimsatt, and Griesemer, 2013). In line with these
ﬁndings, some components of a repertoire are only made explicit
and articulated during training, and sometimes not even then. For
instance, the norms associated with the sharing of data and probes
in model organism communities are now so strongly entrenched
that they are simply copied across generations, usually without
being explicitly discussed or investigated, or ever being contested.
In particular, the practice of depositing genetic sequences in public
databases as soon as they are generated began to take hold in the21There is much more to be said about the relationships between repertoires and
communities, including discussion of relevant scholarship in the social sciences and
history and particularly of literature on group identity and ﬁeld/discipline forma-
tion, but this would require extended exploration and hence is beyond the scope of
this paper.late 1980s and was enshrined formally in the ‘Bermuda Principles’
in the 1990s (Contreras, 2011), after which it became a background
assumption for those doing biological research, particularly since it
became evident that there was much to be gained from these
behaviors (and not much to lose for most researchers) (Maxson
Jones, Ankeny, and Cook-Deegan in preparation).
A more familiar example is the ‘black-boxing’ of theoretical
assumptions, a phenomenon that Kuhn (1962) interpreted as
grounds for conceptual incommensurability among paradigms,
and Bill Wimsatt (2007) discusses as a form of ‘generative
entrenchment.’ Black-boxing can occur when those assumptions
become embedded within the performance of a repertoire. For
instance, using model organism databases makes biologists sub-
scribe to theoretical assumptions embedded within technology-
driven classiﬁcatory practices, often without knowledge about or
explicit endorsement of them (Leonelli, 2016). More generally,
technology is a key component of platforms that tends to become
invisible as soon as the skills required to use them can be taken for
granted within a given community, an insight amply illustrated by
Keating and Cambrosio’s work (2003) on biomedical platforms.
The repertoires that researchers adopt most consciously are the
ones that are easiest for philosophers to document and study, as
evidence is readily available from historical and scientiﬁc literature.
Repertoires that are adopted tacitly, without explicit recognition by
the researcherswho employ them, aremore difﬁcult to identify and
track.22 Their visibility may increase depending on how they
intersect with other repertoires used by the same community at
speciﬁc points in time, particularly in cases of perceived conﬂicts
between norms and behaviors associated with different
repertoires.
Consider the evolution over time of the repertoire utilized by
many model organism communities. This work began in the 1970s
with a strong emphasis on stock centers, because access to
standardized materials was critical to making the repertoire viable.
Emphasis shifted in the 1980s and 1990s to data sharing and
coordination of research efforts. This change was partly due to the
existence of reliable stocks that could be accessed worldwide and
relatively easily, and partly determined by the coordination of the
existing repertoire associated with model organism research with
another repertoire, that of genetic sequencing, which involved
commitment to high-throughput technologies and a focus on a few
key strains as research materials which were considered sufﬁcient
to unravelling questions concerning the relation between different
molecular components. This move went relatively unchallenged
(despite critiques, e.g. Bolker 1995) until the last decade, when
many researchers became interested in the environmental
variability of these organisms, whose study requires comparative
ﬁeld sampling and application of genetic tools to study organismal
forms which occur both within and outside of the laboratory (e.g.,
Sterken, Basten Snoek, Kammenga, & Andersen, 2015). In this
new landscape, the repertoire of genetic sequencing and its
conceptualization of organisms acquired greater visibility by being
explicitly questioned.
Another example is provided by the recent intersection between
model organism research and the emergent repertoire of synthetic
biology, which involves a large amount of standardization,
relatively little attention to organisms as wholes (in favor of more
modular approaches), and funding in the form of private-public
partnerships. In some of these cases, researchers who formerly
relied on long-term governmental funding have been forced to22Here philosophers could beneﬁt by collaborating with sociologists and histo-
rians of science whose data collection techniques are more likely to reveal such
processes and patterns.
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intellectual property regime that includes patenting, down
streaming, and copyright issues. This situation has generated
conﬂicts between existing repertoires, for instance where
researchers wish to publish data as soon as it is produced in
conformity with other work done on a given model organism, and
yet do not know whether data publication would be acceptable to
their private sponsors.23 Researchers involved in both the synthetic
biology and model organisms repertoires are no longer clear to
which expectations around ownership and dissemination of results
they should conform, how, and why.
These examples illustrate how different elements acquire
prominence at different points in the repertoire’s life cycle: what
becomes visible and when may depend on other repertoires at play
within the same community. Thus the same community of
scientists can employ a variety of repertoires at any single point in
time (in line with Fleck’s views and contra Kuhn’s paradigms), in
ways that can be very self-aware and reﬂexive, and at some times
can be merely implicit. There is often no simple, one-to-one
relation between repertoires and communities: some
communities use multiple repertoires at the same time, and a
particular repertoire can be utilized simultaneously by more than
one community.6. Alignment
Communities that adopt a common repertoire share the ability
to align the components of their work, including technologies,
research goals, and materials, with broader components over
which they have much less control, such as funding structures, the
moral economy within the community and more broadly the
scientiﬁc ﬁeld, and social and political structures. Keating and
Cambrosio (2003) stress the importance of (and difﬁculties
in achieving) alignments between different platforms24 which co-
exist within the same epistemic spaces. Their preoccupation with
explaining this phenomenon is similar to ours: far from providing
an epistemic foundation for research practices, platforms are
pragmatic tools which support the organization and management
of such practices, and are successful insofar as they determine
“what works best for a given purpose, given a necessarily limited
amount of information, opportunities and resources” (28).
Similarly, to understand what constitutes a successful repertoire, it
is necessary to investigate how they come to co-ordinate a variety
of diverse componentsdtypically including several platformsdin
ways that enable them to thrive and become embedded as essential
conditions for particular kinds of research practice.
For such alignments to be effective, participants who perform a
shared repertoire need to make assumptions about who the other
relevant participants are, what they do (or do not) know, and what
they can (or cannot) do. Hence participants need to share23See Levin and Leonelli (2016, forthcoming). In relation to synthetic biology, it is
important to stress that this label covers a heterogeneous variety of methods,
concepts, and aims, and thus can result in different scientiﬁc approaches (e.g.,
O’Malley, 2009). At the same time, there are strong institutional and ﬁnancial in-
centives (in the form of favorable governmental policies, preferential funding
streams, university-based hiring procedures and organization of research di-
rections, and so forth) for practitioners to identify with this label and coordinate
their research efforts so as to ﬁt governmental agendas. Largely due to these
‘external’ incentives, synthetic biology arguably constitutes an identiﬁable reper-
toire, albeit one characterized by a high level of pluralism in the methods and
conceptual perspectives adopted by researchers, which may eventually converge
towards a more consistent theoretical approach as the repertoire develops further.
24They deﬁne platforms as “the intersections of distinctive arrangements of in-
struments and programs that seek to articulate biological and population data with
diagnostic and prognostic singularities” (7).knowledge about which actors, knowledge, settings, andmaterials
are relevant to the performance of their target activity, as well
having access to those elements. They also need to possess skills
relevant to using that knowledge and related materials to create
the desired performance (skills which may of course diverge
signiﬁcantly person to person, depending on each individual’s
role). Finally, they need to knowwhich role(s) they are expected to
play within the repertoire, and have expectations as to what
others can and cannot be expected to do (think for instance of the
tacit assumptions around data sharing discussed above). It is
important for participants in repertoires to know the boundaries
and constraints attached to the settings in which they operate:
some of the conditions inwhich repertoires may be created simply
cannot be changed, as they do not depend on any potential actions
of individuals or communities involved, but on much broader
dynamics and situations (such as national policies, economic
climate, ﬁnancial resources at hand, and so on).
To understand the concept of alignment within repertoires, it is
useful to consider examples where (contrary to those above)
repertoires are not resilient, long-lived, or replicated. Researchwith
the mouse in the context of the non-human sequencing programs
in the Human Genome Project presents a clear case of scientists
coming together to meet short-term goals, and attempting to build
on their temporary alliance to foster longer-term collaborations,
but ultimately failing to adopt or replicate the model organism
repertoire as developed in C. elegans, Arabidopsis, zebraﬁsh,
Drosophila, yeast, and other research communities. This failure did
not result in a failure of the research in any obvious way, since the
mouse and those who work on it have made critical contributions
to a range of biomedical efforts over the course of the 20th century,
and the number of researchers working on mice globally far
outstrip numbers associated to work on other organisms (Lewis,
Atkinson, Harrington, & Featherstone, 2013; Rader, 2004).25
While research in other organism-based communities took place
mostly through blue-skies public funding, the majority of research
on the mouse over the last three decades took place in private
facilities, including pharmaceutical testing and clinically-related
endeavors subject to stringent regimes of regulation and
intellectual property (Davies, 2013). Despite several attempts, these
conditions made it impossible for researchers to establish common
and freely accessible resources characteristic of research with other
model organisms, such as centralized stock centers and databases.
Hence transactions associated with strains and other resources are
typically costly, thus limiting access to those who have the requisite
ﬁnances. Undoubtedly some components of the repertoire
associated with model organism work and with molecular biology
as described above were present, including the concept of a ‘model
organism’ itself and the use of certain technologies (particularly
genomic sequencing), but alignment failed to occur between these
components and others, and thus mouse researchers did not have
shared practices, aims, infrastructures, institutions, ﬁnancial
resources, and norms that could serve to co-ordinate these
disparate groups.26 This lack of alignment continues to affect the
knowledge produced by at least some mouse researchers, with
scientists focusing largely on strain-speciﬁc molecular mechanisms25 It also is likely that there was a shared repertoire among those who did early
immunological work (see Rader, 2004), though we cannot pursue those details
here; we are grateful to Scott Gilbert for stressing this point.
26 It may well be that what they did manage to establish was a ‘platform’ in the
sense intended by Keating and Cambrosio (2003) (we are grateful to Chris DiTeresi
for this suggestion), but a detailed comparison between platforms and repertoires
is beyond the scope of this paper.
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tackle comparative and integrative questions.27
Hence, not establishing or reproducing a repertoire typically
occurs where there is a lack of alignment and/or knowledge about
the components of a repertoire as well as about its accompanying
boundaries and constraints. Alignment is not only difﬁcult to
generate, but also to maintain in the long-term, particularly when
repertories are transferred to different situations. Indeed, some
repertoires are not easy to export, and their travelling abilities can
be limited as they must be well-aligned with other factors.28
Consider for instance research with super-colliders in physics.
This case provides an excellent example of a repertoire that
goes well beyond the core technology (though of course the
technologies and accompanying experimental settings are critical
to the scientiﬁc practices of the community), as the success of this
type of work also hinges on methods of communication and
promotion within and beyond the research community, as well as
on associated governmental policies (Traweek,1988). The discovery
of the Higgs bosonwas due to CERN scientists’ abilities to align their
research practices with funding and institutional requirements,
which made it possible for them to collaborate effectively. By
contrast, the attempted use of this repertoire in the United States
exempliﬁes a failure in the alignment of the technology, aims,
public discourse, funding, and governmental policies that resulted
in a dramatic loss of research capabilities and a shift of direction for
the ﬁeld as a whole.29
Due to the creation of various alignments, repertoires also
produce speciﬁc material, theoretical, and social commitments,
which can serve as constraints on future innovation. For instance
in contemporary molecular biology, those constructing data
infrastructures typically attempt to incorporate a range of existing
repertoires from the start, because they want these infrastructures
to be successfully used by a variety of researchers including those
with differing epistemic commitments (Leonelli, 2013). At the same
time, the instruments used for data production (such as mass
spectrometers, microarray chips, and so on) are mass-produced by
companies to focus on a narrow range of data types, which in turn
greatly reduces the sources of evidence generated and used by
researchers (which Ulrich Krohs [2012] dubs ‘convenience
experimentation’). This situation can have negative consequences
as the resulting data can ﬂood the research landscape in a
disproportionate manner, sometimes without quality checks,
which in turn creates incentives to keep exploring these data rather
than creating novel data in response to novel research questions,
thus potentially curtailing scientiﬁc innovation.
Given the potential disadvantages involved in adopting a
repertoire, it is important to note that not having or creating a
repertoire does not in principle compromise a research group’s
ability to produce knowledge (though it certainly can affect it in
practice, as in the cases of research in low-resourced environments
such as sub-Saharan research labs, as analyzed by Bezuidenhout,
Leonelli, Kelly, & Rappert, 2016 and Leonelli under review). What27Another example of lack of alignment leading to the failure to establish a long-
lived repertoire can be found in Knorr-Cetina (1999, 234ff.), who noted the
‘impossibility of cooperation’ inherent in molecular biology laboratories that she
observed in the 1980s. She attributes this to the complexities of the available
technologies and the dominance of individualistic norms in the broader ﬁeld, a
situation that we would argue changed with the advent of large-scale sequencing
projects in the 1990s (Hilgartner, 2013).
28For discussions on related issues about ‘travelling facts,’ see Howlett and Morgan
(2010).
29This example also helps to illustrate another key characteristic of repertoires: no
one component of the repertoire is central, primary, or fundamental (e.g., methods
or techniques, technologies, and so on), in contrast to Lakatos’s hard core in his
account (1970) of scientiﬁc change.it unavoidably affects is the type of knowledge that a research
group is able to produce, which can have both negative and positive
implications. Not establishing a particular type of repertoire in
mouse research and in U.S. particle physics could be argued to have
stimulated signiﬁcant discoveries; the history of science is full of
cases where research groups produce innovative results by resist-
ing the urge to establish a repertoire, or even challenging existing
repertoires (e.g., Chang 2012; Harman and Dietrich, 2013). Thus
repertoires are not necessary to the pursuit of scientiﬁc research
and do not constitute an absolute ideal toward which all scientiﬁc
research groups should strive: they can create blind spots and
forms of path dependence that can be fruitful or problematic,
depending on the situation and point of view.
7. Conclusions
Using the framework of ‘repertoires’ allows exploration of as-
pects of scientiﬁc practice which have been largely overlooked in
philosophical accounts, including economic structures, politics,
norms, and other social and performative features, as well as
applications of research. This framework does not construct
change as primarily generated and shaped by theoretical
developments, as would a Kuhnian-inﬂuenced account, but rather
takes account of administrative, material, technological, and
institutional innovations and explicitly questions whether and
how such innovations accompany, underpin, and/or undercut
theoretical shifts. These non-conceptual aspects of scientiﬁc
practice are not often discussed within scholarly publications (or
when they are, they are mentioned only as needed to support
theoretical claims), which partly explains why they have been
less accessible to philosophers despite having been amply
documented and analyzed by historians and sociologists of
science.
Repertoires permit us to investigate the interrelation between
various components of scientiﬁc practice. The concept of a
‘repertoire’ thus allows for tracking of the organization, continuity,
and coherence in scientiﬁc research practices that Kuhn
characterized as ‘normal science’ without relying on the
occurrence of paradigmatic shifts and revolutions to be able to
identify relevant components. This concept provides a framework
that can facilitate a more comprehensive view of the drivers of
scientiﬁc change in at least four ways:
 by fostering a better understanding of the relationship between
individual contributions and collective practices and norms;
 by forcing philosophers to consider the research practices and
behaviors associated with policy, funding, public relations,
marketing, and institutionsdincluding how and when these
factors do (or do not) aligndthus highlighting the signiﬁcance
of political economy, as well as administrative and legal matters,
for any account of the epistemology of scientiﬁc practice;
 by encouraging a critical assessment of what ‘success’ in science
involves, how it is achieved, and how evaluations of success and
failure can and do shift over time; and
 by broadening our view of what ‘counts’ as scientiﬁc work to
include the contributions of science administrators, technicians,
funders, and other non-scientists whose skills and expertise
may contribute signiﬁcantly to the enactment of research
repertoires.
‘Repertoire’ is both a descriptive and an explanatory notion that
can be used to explore how collaborations work and why particular
research communities prove more long-lived and durable than
others. The repertoires framework requires that the analysis of
collaborations be placed at the center of any general philosophical
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communities, and is complementary to ongoing discussions on
collaboration in philosophy of science as detailed above. It also
requires that particular attention be paid to the performative
aspects of science. The use of this concept fosters exploration of
basic, applied, and translational forms of scientiﬁc practice, and
may extend beyond the realm of science to analyses of the
evolution of cultural practices more generally. As we have shown,
repertoires are particularly useful when exploring the complex
multidisciplinary assemblages that characterize much of
contemporary scientiﬁc practice, but the notion can also inform
analysis of the history of science, particularly relating to research
that is not grounded in any one disciplinary perspective and
involves signiﬁcant collaborations.Acknowledgments
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